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Abstract. The design right is a widely used but poorly understood intellectual property right 
that allows the protection of products’ aesthetics and outer appearances. We study the 
influence of design protection on price by exploiting cross-country differences in the scope of 
protection in the European automotive spare parts market: In some countries, repair parts are 
exempted from design protection, while in others they are not. Based on detailed price data, 
our difference-in-differences estimates imply that design protection increases prices by about 
5–8%, with large differences between carmakers. We then link our findings to the literature 
on deviations from the law of one price. We document large cross-country price deviations 
for identical spare parts and provide evidence that a part of these price deviations can be 
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In 2018, Apple and Samsung finally decided to settle their seven-year dispute over Apple’s 
allegations that Samsung “slavishly” copied designs related to the iPhone and iPad (The 
Economist, 2012; Nellis, 2018). This and other high-stakes court cases show that product 
form and design have become increasingly important for the development of new products 
and that companies are willing to invest substantial resources into defending related 
intellectual property (IP).1 It is therefore surprising that – while patents, copyrights, and 
trademarks have been extensively studied in the economic literature – the industrial design 
right has for the most part escaped the attention of economists.2 
The industrial design right (hereafter, “design right”) is an IP right that protects the 
appearance of a product with the aim of promoting aesthetic innovation and product 
differentiation. The owner can prevent third parties from making, selling, or importing 
articles bearing the protected design for commercial purposes.3 Many industries ranging from 
automotive through clothing, footwear, and sports goods to furniture rely on design 
protection.4 Such protection is especially important for electronic devices, including 
smartphones, with Samsung, Apple, LG, and Philips ranking among the top ten applicants in 
Europe and the United States.5 The number of design right applications is on the rise, 
reaching over 1.02 million filings globally in 2018 (WIPO, 2019). 
Despite its ubiquity, the design right is not harmonized across jurisdictions: While WTO 
members agreed on some minimum requirements under the TRIPS agreement, there is no 
                                                 
1 See also, for example, Verganti (2009). There is a small but growing literature that studies design innovations 
(as opposed to technological innovations), including Rubera and Droge (2013), Jindal et al. (2016), Chan et al. 
(2018), and Dan et al. (2018). 
2 Recent exceptions are Filitz et al. (2015), Beukel et al. (2017), and Heikkilä and Peltoniemi (2019). In the 
management literature, Chan et al. (2018) use data on US design patents to study the role of product form in 
new product development. Dan et al. (2018) combines COMPUSTAT data and design patent registrations to 
study the sources of design innovations. 
3 We refer the reader to Chapter 2 of WIPO (2004) and Article 25 and 26 of the TRIPS agreement.  
4 See Figure C22 in WIPO (2019). For an overview of especially “design-intensive” industries in the EU, we 
refer the reader to Table 40 in EPO & EUIPO (2019).  




consensus on the scope of protection.6 Because of its implications for the economically 
important automotive spare parts market, an especially contentious question is whether 
protecting the design of a component part separately from the product into which it is 
embedded should be possible.  
To inform the debate, it is important to understand the effect of design protection on price. In 
defining the optimal scope of protection, policy makers are facing a trade-off: The broader 
the scope, the more right owners can increase the prices of protected goods, which might 
increase profits and therefore incentivize innovation. However, higher prices might also 
reduce consumer surplus and prevent the creation of follow-on products and innovation. 
A strong price effect would also imply that the lack of harmonization might have broader 
implications. Variation in the scope of design protection might translate into cross-country 
price dispersion for identical goods and might therefore offer (a partial) explanation for 
deviations from the law of one price (LOOP) for identical products, a phenomenon that has 
been widely documented in the economic literature. 
Despite the centrality of the question, no empirical evidence exists on the influence of design 
protection on price. One potential reason for this lack of evidence is that the identification of 
causal effects is complicated because ownership of the respective right is endogenous to 
pricing decisions.7 For example, products with greater commercial appeal are more likely to 
be protected by a design title, but are also likely to be offered at a higher price. In addition, to 
control for unobservable factors, in an ideal setting one would like to compare prices of 
identical goods with and without design protection. However, this is difficult given the lack 
of experimental variation. 
                                                 
6 Schickl (2013) and Rahman (2014) compare the intellectual property laws protecting designs in the EU, the 
US, Japan, and Australia. Yoshioka-Kobayashi et al. (2018) present a more quantitative analysis of differences 
in the registration systems in the EU, US, Japan, China, and South Korea. We also refer the reader to Blackman 
(1996). 
7 These challenges in identifying causal effects are not specific to the design right, but also apply to other IP 




In this article, we address these challenges to identification by taking advantage of cross-
country differences in the scope of design protection in Europe. We focus on the European 
market for (visible) automotive spare parts. As of 2018, in 18 European Union (EU) member 
states, car manufacturers can protect visible spare parts using design rights and therefore 
prohibit the production and import of identical parts by independent manufacturers. In these 
countries, customers must therefore purchase visible repair parts exclusively from original 
manufacturers or their suppliers. In the remaining ten EU member states, national design law 
specifically excludes visible spare parts from this protection via a so-called “repair clause,” 
enabling competition from independent manufacturers. We use a regression model to 
compare the prices of identical spare parts between countries with and without a repair 
clause.  
Our research is based on a novel data set that contains the pre-tax prices of 12 types of spare 
parts for 60 car models from 2001 to 2016 in 16 EU member states plus Norway and 
Switzerland. While the last two are not EU members, they nevertheless participate in the EU 
internal market.8 A key feature of our data is that spare part prices are listed by car model. 
This allows us to make cross-country price comparisons between exactly defined products. 
We can, for example, compare the price of a windscreen for a BMW 5 Series 530d 2993 cc 
2011 between Germany and the UK in 2016. To address the potential concerns of omitted 
variable bias, we also provide difference-in-differences estimates exploiting the fact that the 
radiator, a component part inside the vehicle, is not a visible spare part and therefore not 
subject to the repair clause, regardless of the jurisdiction. 
We show that design protection increases the prices of visible spare parts on average by about 
5–8%, depending on the empirical specification. Based on these estimates, a back-of-the-
                                                 
8 Norway is part of the European Economic Area (EEA), which ensures that it can take part in the EU single 
market. Switzerland has agreed to accept certain aspects of EU legislation in exchange for accessing the EU's 
single market. In particular, since 1999, the EU and Switzerland mutually accept conformity assessment results 




envelope calculation suggests that an EU-wide repair clause would save EU consumers 
between 450 and 720 million Euros annually on the purchase of visible automotive spare 
parts alone. While we find no differences across vehicle sizes, we find that estimated price 
effects vary substantially between carmakers, suggesting differences in the degree to which 
manufacturers exploit design protection in their pricing strategies. We discuss this finding in 
particular in the context of the 2018 press reports that revealed that several major carmakers 
used an algorithmic pricing software (Partneo) to identify the maximum price that consumers 
would be willing to pay for a spare part. Strikingly, we find the strongest effect of design 
protection on pricing for the car manufacturers in our sample that are known to have used the 
pricing software. 
Our findings have important implications for the literature that studies deviations from the 
LOOP. We show that prices of automotive spare parts differ very substantially within the EU 
internal market. In 2016, the headlamp for a Ford Focus III was 30% more expensive in 
France than in the UK. The windscreen for a BMW 5 Series 530d was 42% more expensive in 
Germany compared to Spain. This complements research by others that documents large 
price dispersions for identical goods in the highly integrated EU internal market where formal 
trade barriers were abolished a long time ago and many countries share the same currency.  
We argue that design protection contributes to cross-country price dispersion. Whether such a 
link exists is ex-ante unclear and therefore an empirical question. In countries where visible 
spare parts are design protected (i.e., where no repair clause exists) there is no competition 
from independent spare parts manufacturers that might “arbitrage away” cross-country price 
differences. Carmakers can therefore make better use of pricing-to-market strategies, for 
example, by conditioning spare part prices on purchasing power, fuel taxes, or climate 
conditions. However, the effect of design protection on price dispersion also depends on 
whether design protection of visible parts is predominantly permitted in countries with 




We provide evidence that design protection indeed increases cross-country price dispersion. 
Our evidence is based on two empirical tests. First, as described above, our findings suggest 
that carmakers take into account design protection in their pricing strategies to varying 
degrees. A testable implication is therefore that price dispersion should be largest for those 
carmakers that make most use of such strategies. We show that this in indeed the case in our 
data and that this relation only holds when price dispersion is calculated in the sample of 
countries where visible spare parts can be design protected (i.e., where independent spare part 
manufacturers cannot compete). Second, based on a difference-in-differences estimation 
approach, we find that the price dispersion of identical visible spare parts is relatively larger 
across the set of countries that permit design protection for visible parts compared to 
countries that do not permit protection. Strikingly, no such difference is apparent when 
considering the radiator, a spare part not subject to the repair clause, regardless of the 
jurisdiction. Both tests suggest quantitatively important effects. 
This article makes several important contributions to the economic literature. A large 
literature in economics studies IP rights and their implications on market structure and price. 
The effects of patent protection are well understood, especially in the context of generic entry 
after patent expiry in the pharmaceutical industry. A consistent finding is that the loss of 
exclusivity leads prices drop by 40–50% (e.g., Scherer, 2010; Castanheira et al., 2019; 
European Commission, 2019). For copyright, Li et al. (2018) exploit a differential increase in 
the copyright length of books by dead authors in Britain in 1814. They find a substantial 
effect on price, probably because of publishers’ improved ability to perform intertemporal 
price discrimination. Reimers (2019) identifies a positive effect of copyright on prices by 
exploiting an abrupt change in copyright protection in the year 1923.9 We complement this 
literature by documenting a substantial price effect for the design right. As we argue in more 
detail below, our finding is especially important since the optimal scope of design protection 
                                                 




currently attracts substantial policy interest. Our article also differs methodologically from 
existing studies because we show contemporaneous price effects for identical goods. 
Second, we complement a small literature that, based on survey evidence, finds that design 
rights only play a minor role in appropriating returns from innovations. For example, Blind 
(2006) documents that patenting German firms regard design rights as the least important 
protection instrument. Arundel (2001), Moultrie and Livesey (2014), and Lim et al. (2014) 
report similar findings.10 By contrast, the price effects that we find indicate that – at least in 
the automotive industry – design rights can play a substantial role in appropriating returns 
from innovations. 
Third, we contribute to the large literature on deviations from the LOOP. It has been shown 
that international borders and even regional borders have a surprisingly strong effect on price 
dispersion (Engel and Rogers, 1996; Ceglowski, 2003). Price differentials have been 
attributed to differences in distribution costs (Crucini and Shintani, 2008), differences in 
currencies (Cavallo et al. 2014), and to strategic pricing and varying mark-ups (Haskel and 
Wolf, 2001; Simonovska, 2015).11 Price differentials in the European car market are 
especially well documented: Large price differences persist despite the EU heavily promoting 
the integration of the market (Verboven, 1996; Goldberg and Verboven, 2004, 2005). In 
recent research, Dvir and Strasser (2018) find that active pricing-to-market strategies (e.g., 
based on differences in climate or fuel taxes) might explain some of the differences.  
We provide further empirical evidence of large and persistent price differences for 
homogenous, narrowly defined products in the highly integrated EU market. Unlike the 
existing literature, we identify a specific regulatory difference that affects competition in 
markets and therefore causes price dispersion. Our results therefore lead to the general 
                                                 
10 However, Yoshioka-Kobayashi et al. (2018) find that companies often use design rights to protect their design 
award-winning designs. 
11 Some research finds only negligible deviations from the LOOP for online retail stores (e.g., Cavallo et al., 





conclusion that small regulatory differences across markets can contribute to quantitatively 
important and persistent deviations from the LOOP. As noted by Goldberg and Verboven 
(2005), in-depth analyses of particular markets can therefore greatly help – and might even be 
indispensable – to improve our understanding of what factors can explain the sustained price 
dispersion of homogeneous products in integrated markets.  
Fourth, we are the first to show clear empirical evidence of a link between the price 
dispersion of homogeneous products and the scope of IP right protection. Our article thus 
connects the literature on price differences for homogenous products with a literature that 
studies the fragmentation of IP rights systems in Europe. Examples are van Pottelsberghe and 
Mejer (2010), who document the costs of the fragmented European patent system, as well as 
Herz and Mejer (2019) and Beukel et al. (2017), who study the effects of the partial 
harmonization of the EU system for trademarks and designs, respectively. While the existing 
literature mostly focuses on the effect of fragmentation on the administrative costs for 
applicants, we provide evidence of the effect of the fragmentation of IP rights systems on 
product market outcomes.  
Finally, this article has important policy implications, because it contributes to the 
contentious debate on whether to exempt spare parts from design protection.12 In the EU, 
during the last three decades, the European Commission made three legislative attempts to 
harmonize this issue, but without success.13 On the national level, France and Germany have 
recently been working on legislative proposals to introduce a repair clause for visible spare 
parts into their national design laws. Similar initiatives are underway outside of the EU, for 
example, in the United States and Brazil. 
                                                 
12 The debate received prominent media coverage in some EU countries. For examples from the German and 
French press, we refer the reader to Der Spiegel (2019), Bild (2019), Bellan (2019) in Les Echos, and Tarrain 
(2019) in Auto Plus. 
13 In the initial 1993 proposal for harmonizing industrial design legislation in Europe, the Commission 
suggested a repair clause that would limit to three years the design protection for spare parts used for the 




The remainder of this article is structured as follows. Section 2 briefly describes the 
institutional background of design protection and the repair clause in the EU with a special 
emphasis on the automotive aftermarket. In Section 3, we present the data. In Section 4, we 
show that design protection leads to higher prices for visible spare parts and that car 
manufacturers differ in their pricing strategies. In Section 5, we document that substantial 
deviations from the LOOP exist for identical spare parts and provide evidence that part of 
these deviations are driven by the lack of harmonization of design protection in combination 
with manufacturers’ strategic pricing. In Section 6, we conclude and discuss policy 
implications. 
2. Design protection in the EU automotive aftermarket 
In the EU, a substantial harmonization of design protection has been achieved since the 
1990s.14 Nevertheless, important national differences remain, in particular regarding the 
ability to separately protect component parts that are used to repair a complex product so as 
to restore the product to its original appearance (hereafter, “spare parts”). While spare parts 
are not protectable under the EU Community Design right, on the national level member 
states are free to choose whether to exempt spare parts from design protection for the purpose 
of repair.15 As of 2018, in 18 of the 28 EU member states, spare parts are recognized as 
individual protectable entities.16 The other ten member states provide a so-called repair clause 
under which spare parts are exempted from design protection when utilized for repair 
purposes. We refer the reader to Table A.1 in the appendix for an overview of national 
                                                 
14 First, in 1998 the EU Directive 98/71/EC on the legal protection of designs led to an approximation of 
national design protection laws across EU member states. Second, in 2001 the Community Design Right that 
offers unitary protection across the EU through a single procedure, was introduced. Since then, there exist a dual 
system in the EU whereby applicants can seek protection at the national and/or the EU level. 
15 For a detailed discussion on the repair clause in European Design Law, we refer the reader to Beldiman and 
Blanke-Roeser (2015, 2017). 
16 The maximal duration of design protection for spare parts is the same as for general industrial designs, that is, 
25 years. Exceptions are Denmark and Sweden, where the period of protection is shorter and lasts for 15 years 




protection regimes in the 28 countries that were EU members as of 2016 plus Switzerland 
and Norway. 
An important qualification is that protection is limited to spare parts that are visible in the 
course of normal use of the product in which they are embedded. For the case of a car, this 
means that, while the design of a front door can be protected in jurisdictions in which no 
repair clause exists, the design of a component part inside of the vehicle that is not visible 
under normal use (e.g., a radiator) is not protectable in the EU. 
While design protection is important for many products such as electronic devices, furniture, 
clothing, and footwear, the protection of components parts is most relevant for the 
automotive industry. With more than 300 million vehicles in circulation on EU roads (83% of 
which are passenger cars) and the cost of repair compared to the price of a new car being 
relatively low, the demand for damage repair is significant. According to the European 
Automobile Manufacturers' Association (2019) and Insurance Europe (2019), more than 12 
million motor third-party liability claims are made annually. A recent report estimates that the 
total automotive spare parts retail market in Europe17 has a value of 123 billion Euros (85 
billion for the EU15), with 39% of sales taking place via original equipment supplies 
channels (Koggersbøl et al., 2018). According to GlobalData (2017), in 2017 annual sales of 
visible automotive spare parts – encompassing body parts, integrated lighting, and automotive 
glass – in the EU internal market amounted to about 20 billion Euros18 (16.4 billion for the 
EU15). Further calculations based on GlobalData (2017) show that 45% of sales are attained 
in markets without a repair clause and that 47% of sales go through the vehicle 
manufacturer’s channel. Table A.2 in the appendix shows the top 50 original equipment 
suppliers of spare parts in the EU; 11 of them produce body and interior components.  
                                                 
17 This report only reports data separately for Western Europe (EU15) and Eastern Europe, which consists of the 
EU12 as well as Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, and the Balkans. 





The sale of spare parts is an important part of carmakers’ business. For the year 2014, a 
report by Oliver Wyman (2015) finds that aftersales accounted for a modest 11% of revenues 
but for 38% of profits of carmakers. It is therefore not surprising that carmakers are very 
much aware of the importance of the repair clause for their businesses, as exemplified by an 
excerpt from the 2020 annual report of the Volkswagen Group: “Volkswagen may be 
exposed to increased competition in aftermarkets for regulatory reasons. […] In Germany, 
legislation entered into force on December 2, 2020  to  restrict  or  abolish  design  protection  
for  repair  parts  through  the  introduction  of  a  repair  clause.  In  addition,  the  European  
Commission  is  evaluating  the  market  with  regard  to   existing   design   protection.   A   
possible   restriction   or   abolition  of  design  protection  for  visible  replacement  parts  
could  adversely  affect  the  Volkswagen  Group’s  genuine  parts  business.” 
It is also important to note that the European automotive market is well integrated, which 
makes it especially accessible for our analysis. Under the EU Whole Vehicle Type-Approval 
System, manufacturers can obtain certification for a vehicle type in one EU country and then 
market it in the EU internal market (including Norway and Switzerland) without the need for 
further testing. The type approval regulation also covers safety critical spare parts such as 
glass and lighting. Furthermore, the 2003 Block Exemption Regulation promotes the right of 
vehicle owners to choose workshops for service and repair, as well as policy initiatives that 
established the EU-wide validity of car warranties and registration documents.19 This level of 
harmonization greatly facilitates cross-country price comparisons and the identification of 
potential effects of design protection. 
3. Data 
We use data from annual surveys conducted by the Centro Zaragoza - Instituto de 
Investigación de Vehículos. The surveys were initiated by Insurance Europe to gather price 
                                                 
19 For a detailed overview of recent changes in the regulation of the EU car market, we refer the reader to the 




information on insurance-sensitive automotive spare parts across European countries. They 
cover 12 types of visible spare parts in three segments – body parts, lighting, and automotive 
glass – as well as one non-visible spare part (radiator). In the survey, national insurance 
associations were asked to quote OEM spare part prices from Audatex, a software providing 
collision repair estimations and claims solutions in the automotive insurance industry. Pre-tax 
Euro-denominated prices are reported by country and separately for vehicle models that were 
widely available in Europe in the year of the survey.  
We collected all annual surveys over the period 2001–2016 (data for year 2009 is missing) 
and converted the data into a large four-dimensional panel, which contains a single price 
quote 𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑖,𝑚,𝑐,𝑡 for each spare part 𝑖 for car model 𝑚 in country 𝑐 in year 𝑡. After dropping 
24 records with obviously misreported prices, we are left with 40,946 observations. The panel 
is unbalanced. Depending on the year, it provides price information for about 20 different car 
models in up to 18 countries (16 countries that were EU members by the end of the sample 
period in 2016 plus Norway and Switzerland; see Table A.1 in the appendix). On average, 
each car model is covered for about five consecutive years. Over the period 2001–2016, a 
total of 64 car models by 12 manufacturers (e.g., Mercedes, Toyota, Audi) are covered. Car 
models can be grouped into four categories according to the vehicle size: Minicompact, 




Table 2 reports average prices for different spare part types for the year 2016, with boot lids 
and rear doors being the most and rear lamps the least expensive. From the last four columns, 
it is apparent that these average prices mask substantial differences across car models: for 
                                                 





example, a rear bumper costs 140 Euros for a Renault Clio IV Authentique but 633 Euros for 
a BMW 5 Series 530d. This highlights a key advantage of our data: Our price information on 
car-model-specific spare parts allows us to make cross-country price comparisons for very 
narrowly defined product categories. 
[FIGURE 1] 
4. The effect of design protection on price 
In this section, we study the effect of design protection on price, taking advantage of the 
differences in the scope of protection described in Section 2. We first present descriptive 
evidence as well as results from cross-country regressions. To address potential omitted 
variable bias, we then propose a difference-in-differences approach that uses non-visible 
spare parts as a control group. 
4.1. Descriptive evidence 
Under the hypothesis that design protection affects price, prices for identical spare parts 
should be relatively higher in countries without a repair clause. To explore this, we follow 
Crucini et al. (2005) and others and calculate log deviations from the geometric-average 
European price for spare part 𝑖 for car model 𝑚 in country 𝑐 in year 𝑡 as 𝑞𝑖,𝑚,𝑐,𝑡 =log 𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑖,𝑚,𝑐,𝑡 − 1𝑁 ∑ log 𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑖,𝑚,𝑗,𝑡𝑁𝑗=1 , where 𝑁 is the number of countries. The left panel of 
Figure 1 compares the mean of 𝑞𝑖,𝑚,𝑐,𝑡 for visible spare parts between countries without and 
with a repair clause. We see a large difference of about 7%. 
The right panel makes the same comparison for the radiator spare part. Unlike the other spare 
parts in our data set, the radiator is a component part located inside the vehicle. Because it is 
therefore not visible in the course of normal use, it is not subject to design protection, 
independent of whether country 𝑐 adopted a repair clause, see Section 2. The figure shows 




4.2.  Cross-country regression analysis 
While suggestive, the descriptive evidence only offers limited insights, in particular because 
we cannot exclude that countries with and without a repair clause might systematically differ 
in terms of other characteristics that can affect the pricing of spare parts.21 We propose the 
following cross-country estimating equation, for now only using the subsample of visible 
spare parts: 
log 𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑖,𝑚,𝑐,𝑡 = 𝛽 𝑑𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑔𝑛 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑡𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑐,𝑡 + 𝜎𝑖 + 𝜇𝑚 + 𝜏𝑡 + 𝜃′𝑿𝑐,𝑡+ 𝜌 𝑑𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑚,𝑐 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑚,𝑐,𝑡 (1) 
As before, log 𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑖,𝑚,𝑐,𝑡 is the pre-tax Euro-denominated log price for spare part 𝑖 for car 
model 𝑚 in country 𝑐 in year 𝑡. 𝐷𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑔𝑛 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑡𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑐,𝑡 is an indicator variable that equals 1 if 
country 𝑐 in year 𝑡 offers design protection for visible spare parts (i.e., has no repair clause) 
and 0 otherwise; see Table A.1. The spare part and year fixed effects 𝜎𝑖 and 𝜏𝑡 capture 
differences in prices between spare parts and years. The car model fixed effects 𝜇𝑚 allow 
spare part prices to systematically vary by car model. The estimating equation also includes a 
vector of control variables 𝑿𝑐,𝑡 to alleviate concerns regarding omitted variable bias: It 
includes a dummy variable that equals 1 if country 𝑐 is a member of the Eurozone as well as 
real GDP per capita in PPPs (in logs) from the Penn World Tables 9.1 (Feenstra et al., 2015). 
Finally, the equation includes an indicator variable that equals 1 if model 𝑚 is by a car brand 
that is “domestic” in country 𝑐 (e.g., VW in Germany). 
Estimating equation (1) has several potential weaknesses. First, the spare part prices differ by 
car model. As we saw in Table 2, a new windscreen for a Renault Clio IV is cheaper than for 
a BMW 5 Series. The car model fixed effects 𝜇𝑚 only fully capture this in the special case in 
which all spare parts of a given model are priced proportionally higher. Second, the 
specification only captures year-specific effects that uniformly affect the prices of spare parts 
                                                 
21 In Appendix Table A.3, we report balance tests that suggest that various covariates do not significantly differ 




of all models in all countries. We address both of these points by estimating a more flexible 
regression equation that includes a full set of interacted spare-part-by-model-by-year fixed 
effects 𝜑𝑖,𝑚,𝑡: 
log 𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑖,𝑚,𝑐,𝑡 = 𝛽 𝑑𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑔𝑛 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑡𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑐,𝑡 + 𝜑𝑖,𝑚,𝑡 + 𝜃′ 𝑿𝑐,𝑡 + 𝜌 𝑑𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑚,𝑐  + 𝜀𝑖,𝑚,𝑐,𝑡 (2) 
Identification comes from differences in the pricing of the same spare part for the same car 
model in the same year between countries in which spare parts are covered by design 
protection and countries in which an exemption via a repair clause exists. 
[TABLE 3] 
The results based on estimating equations (1) and (2) are reported in Table 3. In column (1), 
we find that design protection of visible spare parts increases prices on average by about 8%. 
The coefficient estimate is statistically highly significant. Controlling for real GDP per capita 
and including dummy variables for Eurozone membership and for “domestic” manufacturers 
as well as adding car-model fixed effects in columns (2) and (3) decreases the coefficient 
estimate to about 6%. Coefficient estimates remain very similar when adding spare-part-by-
model and spare-part-by-model-by-year fixed effects in columns (4) and (5). 
[TABLE 4] 
4.2.1. Spare part types 
We now estimate the effect separately for the 13 spare part types, of which 12 are visible and 
one is non-visible (the radiator). To do so, we extend regression equations (1) and (2) by 
interacting the variable 𝑑𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑔𝑛 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑡𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑐,𝑡 with an array of dummy variables indicating 




log 𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑖,𝑚,𝑐,𝑡 = ∑ 𝛽𝑗𝑗  𝟙[𝑖 = 𝑗] × 𝑑𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑔𝑛 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑡𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑐,𝑡 + 𝜑𝑖,𝑚,𝑡 + 𝜃′ 𝑿𝑐,𝑡+ 𝜌 𝑑𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑚,𝑐 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑚,𝑐,𝑡 
(3) 
𝟙[𝑖 = 𝑗] is an indicator function. The estimates are shown in Table 4. We find positive and 
significant effects for all visible spare parts in all specifications. In the most restrictive 
specification reported in columns (4), estimates range from 3% for headlamps to 9% for rear 
wings and 11% for flasher lamps.  
The most important finding for Table 4 is that we cannot reject the null hypothesis that the 
repair clause has no effect on the price of the radiator. This finding lends support to our 
difference-in-differences estimation approach that uses the radiator as a control group for our 
estimates. 
4.3. Difference-in-differences regression analysis 
A drawback of estimating equations (1) to (3) is that they do not allow for the inclusion of 
country fixed effects. Although our estimates account for a limited number of control 
variables, without allowing for country fixed effects, we cannot exclude the possibility that 
our results might be driven by omitted variable bias. Countries without a repair clause might 
share common and unobserved characteristics that also affect the pricing of spare parts. 
Because our sample spans the time period 2001–2016, one option would be to base our 
estimates on within-country policy changes. Unfortunately, out of the 18 countries in our data 
set, only Poland introduced a repair clause during the sample period (in 2007; see Table A.1 
in the appendix). That is, despite carrying a 𝑡 subscript, the variation in 𝑑𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑔𝑛 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑡𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑐,𝑡 
is almost completely cross-sectional.  
We therefore follow an alternative approach. As discussed above, unlike the other spare parts 
in our data set, the radiator is a component part located inside the vehicle. Because it is 




independent of whether country 𝑐 adopted a repair clause. We propose the following 
estimating equation that uses the radiator as a control group: 
log 𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑖,𝑚,𝑐,𝑡 = 𝛽 𝑑𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑔𝑛 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑡𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑐,𝑡 × 𝑣𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑖 + 𝜑𝑖,𝑚,𝑡 + 𝜆𝑚,𝑐,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑚,𝑐,𝑡 (4) 
𝐷𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑔𝑛 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑡𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑐,𝑡 × 𝑣𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑖 is an interaction between the variable 𝑑𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑔𝑛 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑡𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑐,𝑡 and an indicator variable that equals 1 if a spare part 𝑖 is visible and 0 
otherwise (the radiator). The estimating equation includes a full set of interacted country, car 
model, and year fixed effects 𝜆𝑚,𝑐,𝑡 and therefore allows for country-specific price 
differences to also vary by year and car model. These fixed effects therefore not only pick up 
cross-country variation due to factors such as purchasing power or local costs at the retail 
level, but also account for possible cross-country price differentials of specific car models or 
brands that might be driven, for example, by factors such as fuel taxes or weather conditions, 
even when changing over time. Under the assumption that the radiator is a good control 
group, it is highly unlikely that our results are subject to omitted variable bias. Note that the 
fixed effects absorb the mean effects 𝑑𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑔𝑛 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑡𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑐,𝑡 and 𝑣𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑖, the vector of 
control variables 𝑿𝑐,𝑡, as well as the indicator variable 𝑑𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑚,𝑐.  
Estimating equation (4) can be interpreted as a difference-in-differences estimator that 
implements the following test: Consider the price difference between visible and non-visible 
spare parts for the same car model, year, and country. Under the hypothesis that the design 
protection of visible spare parts increases prices, we would expect this difference to be larger 
for countries that do not have a repair clause (𝑑𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑔𝑛 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑡𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑐,𝑡 = 1) compared to 




spare part (the radiator) is indeed not affected by the repair clause and therefore serves as a 
valid control group.22 We showed evidence of this in Table 4, in Section 4.2.1, above. 
[TABLE 5] 
The results are shown in Table 5. Column (1) reports a constrained specification in which 
country fixed effects are not included. The resulting estimate is very similar to the estimates 
reported in Table 3. When including country fixed effects in column (2), this estimate 
increases slightly, to almost 7%. In columns (3) and (4), we also allow spare part prices to 
vary by country-by-year as well as by country-by-car-model-by-year. The resulting estimate 
is about 4.7% and is highly statistically significant. 
In Appendix Table A.4, we show that our results are also robust when the analysis is 
constrained to the four cheapest spare parts in our sample (head lamp, front wing, rear lamp, 
radiator, see Table 2).  Another concern is that our results might be driven by one or two 
countries in our sample with especially high or low prices. In Table A.5, we therefore report 
the estimates shown column (4) of Table 5 when one country at a time is dropped from the 
sample.  In all cases, the estimate of interest remains positive and highly significant. 
4.3.1. Vehicle size 
The effect of design protection for spare parts might differ by vehicle size. We therefore 
estimate the effect separately for four size classes: minicompact, subcompact, compact, and 
mid-size. To do this, we extend regression equation (4) by further interacting the interaction 𝑑𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑔𝑛 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑡𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑐,𝑡 × 𝑣𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑖 with an array of dummy variables:  
log 𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑖,𝑚,𝑐,𝑡 = ∑ 𝛽𝑗𝑗  𝟙[𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑚 = 𝑗] × 𝑑𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑔𝑛 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑡𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑐,𝑡 × 𝑣𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑖 (5) 
                                                 
22 In models of oligopoly supply with multiproduct firms, the price of radiators might depend on the prices of 
other (visible) spare parts which in turn depend on the existence of a repair clause. We believe it is reasonable to 
assume that any potential price effects would be of second order importance, in particular because the radiator 




+𝜑𝑖,𝑚,𝑡 + 𝜆𝑚,𝑐,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑚,𝑐,𝑡 
The indicator function 𝟙[𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑚 = 𝑗] equals 1 if car model 𝑚 is of size 𝑗 and 0 otherwise. 
Note that the mean effects ∑ 𝛽𝑏𝑏  𝟙[𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑚 = 𝑗] × 𝑑𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑔𝑛 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑡𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑐,𝑡 are absorbed by the 
country-by-model-by-year fixed effects 𝜆𝑚,𝑐,𝑡. 
While the estimates reported in Appendix Table A.6 are very stable across specifications, 
there seems to be no clear pattern related to vehicle size: We find large and statistically 
highly significant effects for minicompact, subcompact, and small family cars. For mid-size 
cars, we find a slightly smaller effect that only becomes significantly different from zero 
when including the full battery of fixed effects in column (4). The fact that we find an effect 
of the repair clause independent of vehicle size (in column [4]) highlights its importance. 
4.3.2. Carmakers and strategic pricing 
We analyze the effect of the repair clause separately for the 12 car manufacturers in our 
sample by estimating a modified version of equation (5): 
log 𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑖,𝑚,𝑐,𝑡 = ∑ 𝛽𝑗𝑗  𝟙[𝑐𝑎𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑘𝑒𝑟𝑚 = 𝑗] × 𝑑𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑔𝑛 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑡𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑐,𝑡 × 𝑣𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑖 
+𝜑𝑖,𝑚,𝑡 + 𝜆𝑚,𝑐,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑚,𝑐,𝑡 
(6) 
𝟙[𝑐𝑎𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑘𝑒𝑟𝑚 = 𝑗] is an indicator function that equals 1 if car model 𝑚 is by carmaker 𝑗 and 
0 otherwise. 
[TABLE 6] 
The results are shown in Table 6. We find that the coefficient estimates vary considerably 
across manufacturers: We estimate coefficients that are not statistically different from zero 




Renault with coefficients of up to 13%. As can be seen in Table A.7, the results remain very 
similar when allowing estimates to differ by manufacturer and vehicle size. 
First, there seems to be no clear distinct pattern for luxury brands. For example, we find a 
significant price effect for Mercedes but not for BMW. This is noteworthy, since one might 
have thought that buyers of luxury cars may be less price sensitive and would always prefer 
original parts. Under such a hypothesis, we would have expected the price effect of the repair 
clause to be weaker for luxury cars. 
Second, our findings are interesting in the context of press reports from 2018, when it became 
known that five major carmakers used an algorithmic pricing software (Partneo) to identify 
the maximum price that consumers would be willing to pay for a spare part. Thanks to this 
software, between 2008 to 2013, these major carmakers increased prices on average by 15%, 
boosting their total revenues by more than 1 billion US dollars (e.g., Philippin, 2018; Gnirke, 
2018a, 2018b; Bergin and Frost, 2018; and Mandrescu, 2018). Strikingly, Peugeot and 
Renault, for which we find large effects, are the two carmakers that are known to have used 
the Partneo software and that are covered in our data.23  
Our findings suggest that the degree to which car manufactures exploit design protection in 
their pricing strategies varies substantially. While we can only speculate what might explain 
these different pricing approaches, it is unlikely that the differences stem from a lack of 
knowledge of some market participants of the existence of the Partneo (or similar) pricing 
software. For example, according to Gnirke (2018b), BMW confirmed that they were in talks 
with Accenture, the owner of the software, but that they were not interested in the product. 
                                                 





VW conducted a pilot test with the software in September and December 2011 but eventually 
decided not to use it.24 
What seems more likely is that the different approaches regarding the pricing of spare parts 
might reflect contrasting business strategies or company characteristics. For example, a 
carmaker with a more long-term strategic view and/or with a more valuable brand might be 
concerned that fully exploiting its price setting power on visible spare parts might damage the 
company’s reputation. In particular, customers that only find out about potentially very costly 
spare parts after having bought a car might decide to purchase a different brand next time. In 
this context, an interesting question, which unfortunately is beyond the scope of this article, is 
to what extent consumers take into account the expected future costs of spare parts when 
deciding on the purchase of a car.25  
[TABLE 7] 
4.3.3. Tripe differences: A case study for Poland 
As mentioned above, out of the 18 countries in our data set, only Poland introduced a repair 
clause during the sample period in 2007, see Table A.2. In this section, we assess the 
robustness of our findings by exploiting the policy change in Poland in a more “traditional” 
difference-in-differences setting as well as in a difference-in-difference-in-differences setting. 
To this end, we begin by comparing the prices of visible spare parts in Poland before and 
after the introduction of the repair clause in 2007 with the respective prices in the Czech 
Republic. We chose the Czech Republic as the control because it never introduced a repair 
                                                 
24 It is important to note that the use of pricing algorithms might also entail competition law risks due to 
“algorithmic collusion.” For example, if the same pricing algorithm was used by several carmakers and this was 
common knowledge among carmakers, then this might eliminate the uncertainty of competition in the market 
and facilitate collusion. See, for example, Ezrachi and Stucke (2017) and Marx et al. (2018). 
25 This is also related to the ongoing discussion in competition policy on how to define markets in the presence 
of aftermarkets. A key question is whether and to what extent customers already take into account the pricing of 
a secondary product when buying a primary product. If they do, then it might be appropriate to define a “system 
market” which comprises both the primary and secondary product. Examples of primary and secondary products 
other than car and spare parts are printers and ink cartridges, computers and software, smartphones and apps. 
See, for example, (OECD, 2018) that provides an executive summary of the OECD’s 2017 roundtable on 




clause and because, out of the countries in our sample, it might be considered to be culturally 
the “most similar” to Poland. We use the following estimating equation: 
log 𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑖,𝑚,𝑐,𝑡 = 𝛼 𝑃𝑜𝑙𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑐 + 𝛽 𝑃𝑜𝑙𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑐 × 𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑡 
+𝜑𝑖,𝑚,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑚,𝑐,𝑡 
(7) 
𝑃𝑜𝑙𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑐 is an indicator that is 1 for Poland and 0 for the Czech Republic. The variable 𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑡 
is an indicator that is 1 for the post-treatment period. The coefficient of interest is 𝛽, which 
captures the differential change in visible spare part prices relative to the Czech Republic 
from 2007 on, the year when the repair clause was introduced in Poland. Note that, due to the 
data constraints described in Table A.2, the pre- and post-treatment periods consist of the 
years 2001-2003 and 2011-2013, respectively. The specification includes spare-part-by-
model-by-year fixed effects. Under the assumption that without the policy change visible 
spare part prices would have evolved relatively similar in the two countries, the estimated 
coefficient 𝛽 is informative about the price effect of the repair clause. The results reported in 
Table 7 indicate that the repair clause led to a decrease of prices for visible spare parts by 
about 13%, an effect that is quantitatively larger than what is suggested by our main 
specification reported in Table 5. 
By also including non-visible spare parts (the radiator) in the sample, we can push the 
analysis further and estimate a difference-in-difference-in-differences regression equation: 
log 𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑖,𝑚,𝑐,𝑡 = 𝛾 𝑃𝑜𝑙𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑐 × 𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑡 × 𝑣𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑖 + 𝜑𝑖,𝑚,𝑡 + 𝜆𝑚,𝑐,𝑡 + 𝜔𝑖,𝑐 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑚,𝑐,𝑡 (8) 
The coefficient of interest 𝛾 captures the price change of visible compared to non-visible (and 
therefore not affected) spare parts in Poland post-2007 relative to the respective price change 
in the Czech Republic (where no repair clause was introduced). This approach also allows to 




fixed effects 𝜔𝑖,𝑐 that capture time-invariant spare-part-specific price differences between 
Poland and the Czech Republic. This should alleviate most concerns regarding potential 
omitted variable bias. Note that all other main and interaction effects such as  𝑃𝑜𝑙𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑐 ×𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑡 and  𝑃𝑜𝑙𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑐 × 𝑣𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑖 are absorbed by the fixed effects. A constrained specification 
(that does not include fixed effects 𝜔𝑖,𝑐) and the full specification are reported in columns (2) 
and (3) of Table 7, respectively. The results are quantitatively very similar to the difference-
in-differences specification and corroborate our finding that the introduction of the repair 
clause in Poland led to a substantial reduction of prices of visible spare parts.  
5. The effect of design protection on price dispersion 
In the previous section, we documented that, for the case of automotive spare parts, the 
design right has substantial price effects. In this section, we link our findings to the literature 
on deviations from the LOOP. We begin by documenting the large extent of price dispersion 
of automotive spare parts in Europe and show that only modest price convergence took place 
over our sample period. We then provide empirical evidence that price dispersion is to a large 
part driven by the lack of harmonization in the scope of design protection in combination 
with pricing-to-market strategies by car manufacturers. 
5.1. Price dispersion and convergence 
Following Goldberg and Verboven (2005), we begin by calculating aggregate price indices 
for the 18 countries in our sample using a hedonic price regression.  Figure 2 plots these 
indices for some selected countries. Systematic cross-country price differences of spare parts 
exist: for example, in 2001, Denmark was 30% more expensive than Belgium (the reference 
country) while Germany was about 15% cheaper. Price differences are very large but remain 






Figure A.1 in the appendix provides a more comprehensive overview of price dispersion: It 
shows histograms of log deviations from the geometric-average European price for spare part 𝑖 for car model 𝑚 in year 𝑡, 𝑞𝑖,𝑚,𝑐,𝑡 = log 𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑖,𝑚,𝑐,𝑡 − 1𝑁 ∑ log 𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑖,𝑚,𝑗,𝑡𝑁𝑗=1 , where 𝑁 is the 
number of countries. It is apparent that deviation from the LOOP can be very large: Across 
all years, the standard deviation is about 17%. While a decrease is apparent compared to 
2001, deviations remain large as of 2016. 
We study price convergence more formally by considering the standard deviation of pre-tax 
Euro-denominated log prices for spare part 𝑖 for car model 𝑚 in year 𝑡 across countries 𝑐, Ξ𝑖,𝑚,𝑡 = 100 × 𝑆𝑡𝑑(log 𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑖,𝑚,𝑐,𝑡 | 𝑖, 𝑚, 𝑡) (e.g., Crucini et al., 2005; Dvir and Strasser, 
2018). Figure A.2 in the appendix visualizes the distribution of Ξ𝑖,𝑚,𝑡 using a box plot. Boxes 
represent the 25th–75th percentile range, and the horizontal line denotes the median. The 
results remain robust when using the price range instead of the standard deviation. 
A visual inspection of Appendix Figure A.2 suggests that price dispersion only slightly 
decreased over our sample period. We explore this more formally using the following 
estimating equation: 
Ξ𝑖,𝑚,𝑡 = 𝛽1𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑡2 + 𝜅𝑖,𝑚 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑚,𝑡 (9) 
The coefficients 𝛽1 and 𝛽2 capture a (potentially quadratic) time trend. Because the 
regression includes spare-part-by-car-model fixed effects 𝜅𝑖,𝑚, any potential time trend is 
identified from within spare part price dispersion over time and our results are unlikely to be 
affected by composition bias. Results are shown in Table 8. In column (1), we impose the 
restriction 𝛽2 = 0 and find evidence of a linear decline in price dispersion between 2001 and 




the pace of decline in more recent years.26  Results from an extended regression equation 
reported in columns (3) and (4) show that, while price dispersion between Eurozone members 
is relatively smaller, there is no evidence that Eurozone membership leads to faster price 
convergence.27 In columns (5) and (6), we provide first evidence of a link between price 
dispersion and the design protection: We report estimates when regression equation (9) is 
estimated separately for countries without and with design protection for visible spare parts. 
While the decrease in price dispersion over time is similar in both cases, the estimated 
constants (16.2 vs. 21.3) indicate that there is a substantial difference in the level of price 
dispersion between the two groups. 
[TABLE 8] 
5.2. Strategic pricing and price dispersion 
The analysis above leaves little doubt that, despite modest price convergence in recent years, 
the pricing of spare parts in the EU internal market is fragmented across national lines and 
that large and sustained deviation from the LOOP exist. A crucial question is to what extent 
these deviations can be explained by the divergent rules on the design protection of spare 
parts and the implied price effects demonstrated in Section 4. 
Carmakers use pricing-to-market strategies that condition prices on country-specific 
characteristics such as purchasing power, fuel taxes, or climate conditions (e.g., Dvir and 
Strasser, 2018). In countries where spare parts are not design protected (i.e., where a repair 
                                                 
26 To make sure that the decline in price dispersion is not driven by a changing country composition in our 
sample over time, we also estimated regressions results for a subsample of eight EU member states that are 
present in at least 12 of the 15 years that our data spans. While quantitatively smaller, the estimates confirm a 
slight decline in price dispersion over our sample period. These results are available upon request. 
27 Our findings are not conclusive regarding whether it was the common currency that led to a decrease in price 
dispersion or whether countries that joined the European Monetary Union (EMU) were already better integrated 
to begin with. A large literature that studies the effect of the Euro on the LOOP and price converge and finds 
mixed results. Allington et al. (2005) finds price convergence due to the adoption of the Euro. Goldberg and 
Verboven (2004) document that the Euro decreases price dispersion for the automotive sector. To the contrary, 
Engel and Rogers (2004), Parsley and Wei (2008), and Fischer (2012) find no evidence that the Euro causes 
price convergence. Imbs et al. (2010) and Glushkenkova and Zachariadis (2016) find lower price dispersion for 
EMU members, but they cannot directly link this to the single currency. For the case of online retail stores, 
Cavallo et al. (2014), using price data from online retail stores, find that the LOOP holds well within currency 




clause exists), independent spare parts manufacturers can compete with original 
manufacturers (carmakers), and arbitrage ensures that price differences cannot become too 
large. To the contrary, in countries without a repair clause, where the production and 
importation of design-protected spare parts by independent manufacturers is prohibited, such 
strategies might lead to large and sustained deviations from the LOOP. Finally, the effect of 
design protection on price dispersion also depends on whether design protection of visible 
parts is predominantly permitted in low or high cost countries.  
Under the hypothesis that design protection is contributes to price dispersion, a first testable 
implication is that the general level of cross-country price dispersion for countries without a 
repair clause should be relatively higher. We provided first evidence of this in columns (5) 
and (6) of Table 8. A more detailed comparison is shown in Figure A.3 in the appendix. 
However, while suggestive, we cannot exclude the possibility that (a part of) the difference is 
due to unobserved heterogeneity: Countries that have a repair clause might be structurally 
more similar to each other than countries that do not have a repair clause. 
We therefore consider a second testable implication: In Section 4.3.2, we documented that the 
price effect of design protection differs substantially between car manufacturers, potentially 
because the degree to which they exploit design protection for strategic pricing varies. Under 
the hypothesis that divergent rules on the protection of spare parts contribute to price 
dispersion, we would therefore expect to see more pronounced price dispersion for carmakers 
for which we also find larger price effects. We explore this by estimating the following 
regression equation: 
Ξ𝑖,𝑚,𝑡 = 𝛼 + ∑ 𝛽𝑗𝑗≠𝑀𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑑𝑒𝑠  𝟙[𝑐𝑎𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑘𝑒𝑟𝑚 = 𝑗] + 𝜅𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑚,𝑡 (10) 
The coefficients 𝛽𝑗 capture the carmaker-specific price dispersion relative to Mercedes, the 




column (1) of Table 9. The estimate of the constant 𝛼 implies an average standard deviation 
of 16.3 points for Mercedes. Our estimates of 𝛽𝑗 suggest substantial differences in price 
dispersion between different brands: Only for three out of eleven manufacturers, we cannot 
reject the hypothesis that price dispersion is equal to the reference category.  
[FIGURE 3] 
The left panel of Figure 3 shows a plot of the manufacturer-specific price dispersion (column 
(1) of Table 9) against the estimated manufacturer-specific price effect from equation (6) 
(reported in column [4] of Table 6). A strong positive relationship is apparent: Cross-country 
price dispersion is indeed highest for the carmakers for which we found the strongest price 
effects in Section 4, indicating a link between price dispersion and strategic pricing based on 
design protection.  
We conduct a placebo test to make sure that this result is not spurious: By definition, car 
manufacturers can only use strategic pricing based on design protection in countries that did 
not implement a repair clause. Therefore, if price dispersion is indeed driven by strategic 
pricing based on design protection, the positive relationship should disappear once price 
dispersion is calculated for the set of countries that have a repair clause. Columns (2) and (3) 
of Table 9 report results when regression equation (10) is estimated separately for countries 
without and with a repair clause. The right panel of Figure 3 indeed shows that, while there is 
a strong positive relationship for the sample of countries without a repair clause, no such link 
is apparent for the sample of countries that have a repair clause. Our data suggests that the 
effects are quantitatively important: For the carmakers that make most use of strategic 
pricing, price dispersion almost doubles. 




We provide a final test of our hypothesis by using an estimating equation analogous to 
equation (4)  
Ξ𝑖,𝑚,𝑡𝑑 = 𝛽 𝑑𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑔𝑛 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑡𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑑 × 𝑣𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑖 + 𝜑𝑖,𝑚,𝑡 + 𝜆𝑚,𝑑,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑚,𝑑,𝑡 (11) 
where Ξ𝑖,𝑚,𝑡𝑑=1   and Ξ𝑖,𝑚,𝑡𝑑=0  are the standard deviations of pre-tax Euro-denominated log prices 
for spare part 𝑖 for car model 𝑚 in year 𝑡 across countries with and without design protection 
for visible spare parts, respectively. 𝜆𝑚,𝑑,𝑡 are car-model-by-year fixed effects that can also 
vary by countries with and without design protection for visible parts (𝑑 = 1 or 𝑑 = 0). Two 
simplified specifications as well as the full specification are reported in Table 10 in columns 
(1)-(2) and (3), respectively. In all cases, the estimated coefficient 𝛽 implies that, relative to 
non-visible spare parts, the price dispersion of visible parts is about 0.7 points higher in 
countries that do have design protection for visible spare parts. Given that the average price 
dispersion of visible spare parts in countries where they are not design protected is 12.7, these 
results suggest that design protection increases deviations from the LOOP by about 5%. To 
conclude, our analysis lends support to the hypothesis that divergent rules on design 
protection in the EU contribute to deviations from the LOOP. 
[TABLE 10] 
6. Conclusions 
We studied the influence of design protection on price by exploiting cross-country 
differences in the scope of protection in the EU. Using detailed price information on 
automotive spare parts, we found that design protection increases prices for identical spare 
parts by 5–8%. We found large differences between car manufacturers, suggesting that their 
pricing strategies vary in the degree to which they take design protection legislation into 
account. We then linked this evidence to the literature on the LOOP: We documented that, in 




parts (e.g., the front door of a BMW 5 Series 530d) and provided evidence that differences in 
the scope of design protection in combination with carmakers’ pricing-to-market strategies 
can explain some of these deviations. 
Our findings have important policy implications. Although WTO members agree on 
minimum standards for their protection under the TRIPS agreement, there is no common 
definition of industrial design or regarding what kind of object is eligible for protection. 
Given that design protection is widely used in many industries, ranging from consumer 
electronics (such as smartphones) to textiles, furniture, and the automotive sector, economic 
evidence on the optimal scope of protection is needed to inform the debate.  
The strong price effects that we documented in this article imply that – contrary to survey 
evidence (e.g., Blind, 2006) – design rights can play a role in appropriating returns from 
innovations. A back-of-the-envelope calculation based on our estimates suggests that this 
results in high costs for consumers in the EU. We documented that the annual value of the 
market for visible automotive spare parts in the EU amounts to about 20 billion Euros, with 
45% of sales occurring in countries without a repair clause. Our estimates of a price effect of 
5–8% imply that, if there was an EU-wide repair clause, EU consumers would save between 
450 and 720 million Euros annually28 on the purchase of visible automotive spare parts 
alone.29  
An important insight from our study is that car manufactures seem to vary in the degree to 
which they strategically exploit their pricing power due to design protection. While we 
estimated non-significant effects for some manufacturers, for others, we found price effects 
of up to 13%. This finding is especially interesting when seen in the context of reports from 
                                                 
28 With “savings” we refer here to the counterfactual decrease in spending of EU consumers for a given quantity 
of spare parts. The effect on total consumer spending on automotive spare parts of course also depends on the 
price elasticity of demand. 
29 Another potentially interesting aspect are the distributional consequences of the repair clause. Under the 
hypothesis that buyers of luxury cars are less price sensitive and always prefer original parts, we would have 
expected relatively larger price effects for non-luxury cars. However, as discussed in Section 4.3.2, this is not 




2018, at which point it became known that five major carmakers used an algorithmic pricing 
software (Partneo) to identify the maximum price consumers would be willing to pay for 
automotive spare parts.30 Thanks to this software, between 2008 to 2013 these major 
carmakers increased prices of visible spare parts by 15% on average, boosting their total 
revenues by more than 1 billion US dollars.31 Strikingly, we find especially strong price 
effects for the two carmakers that are known to have used the Partneo software and that are 
covered in our data.  
A limitation of our study is that our empirical setting is not suited to discern whether design 
protection also leads to more innovation. More empirical research is needed to better 
understand the trade-off between reduced consumer surplus due to higher prices of design-
protected goods and increased incentives for creation.  
Our findings are especially valuable for informing the contentious debate on exempting 
visible repair parts from design protection in the EU and beyond. In 2004, the European 
Commission proposed the introduction of an EU-wide repair clause in the EU design 
legislation. Due to a lack of progress in the negotiations, the proposal was eventually 
withdrawn in 2014, but since then, initiatives aiming to introduce repair clauses have been 
launched on the national level in France and Germany. The German government decided to 
introduce a repair clause in German design law that came into force on 2 December 2020.32 
Outside the EU, the United States and Brazil have recently made attempts to introduce repair 
clauses (Beldiman and Blanke-Roeser, 2017). 
A recently concluded public consultation by the European Commission highlights that the 
lack of harmonization remains a problem:33 A majority (over 80%) of respondents affirmed 
                                                 
30 See Calvano et al. (2019) for a related discussion on algorithmic pricing and implications for competition 
policy. 
31 For media coverage of this case, we refer the reader to Philippin (2018), Gnirke (2018a, 2018b), Bergin and 
Frost (2018), and Mandrescu (2018).  
32 https://www.bmjv.de/SharedDocs/Pressemitteilungen/DE/2020/091020_Staerkung_fairer_Wettbewerb.html 




that the fragmentation of the scope of design protection was problematic for their cross-
border operations, as it creates legal uncertainty and unpredictability. It is seen as creating 
unequal and unfair conditions of competition in the EU, for example, because it hinders the 
creation of European supply chains and leads to “repair tourism” across member states. 
However, despite their recognition of the problem and the need for harmonization, 
stakeholders are divided in their views on how to achieve it.  
The relevance of the repair clause is not limited to the automotive spare parts market. Design 
protection of spare parts is important for other industries, including watches, smartphones, 
and electronics and household appliances (Europe Economics, 2015; Hartwig, 2016).34 The 
importance of the repair clause is likely to increase in coming years, as technologies such as 
3D printing increasingly facilitate the on-site and on-demand fabrication of spare parts and 
therefore lower the barriers to entry for independent manufacturers (Anastassacos, 2015; 
Beldiman and Blanke-Roeser, 2017, Chapter 7). Another important factor is that in the 
context of the political commitment to promote a more circular and sustainable economy,35 
there is a growing concern that design protection of spare parts is in conflict with the aim to 
increase the durability and reparability of products (e.g., Svensson et al., 2018).  
Finally, the evidence presented in this article might contribute to a better understanding of 
cross-country price dispersion. Our findings suggest the more general conclusion that small 
regulatory differences across markets can contribute to quantitatively important and persistent 
deviations from the LOOP. As illustrated by the case of the Partneo software discussed 
above, advances in strategic pricing might further amplify this development. In line with 
Goldberg and Verboven (2005), we therefore conclude that in-depth analyses of particular 
markets can greatly help – and might even be indispensable – in improving our understanding 
                                                 
34 For example, Dyson sued Qualtex for manufacturing and selling spare parts for Dyson vacuum cleaners that 
were virtually identical to the Dyson originals (see also Hartwig, 2016, page 128). 
35 For the case of the EU, we refer the reader to the 2020 “Circular Economy Action Plan” (European 
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Table 1: Sample of records from our dataset 
 








Table 2: Cross-country automotive spare part mean prices, 2016 
    
Car model 
Spare party type Mean 
Renault Clio IV 
Authentique 




















549.6  513.3  360.8  495.2  605.2 
Rear Door 
 
505.6  591.7  321.7  473.4  694.3 
Front Door 
 
500.7  483.6  369.4  490.0  713.9 
Rear Wing 
 
474.8  480.0  440.1  450.8  651.4 
Bonnet 
 
393.2  364.1  273.7  445.4  887.5 
Front Bumper 
 
359.3  244.6  333.2  428.7  597.3 
Rear Bumper 
 
337.8  140.2  315.3  390.4  633.3 
Windscreen 
 
285.8  187.9  334.2  314.7  344.1 
Radiator* 
 
253.1  256.7  216.5  139.8  449.7 
Head Lamp 
 
253.0  197.8  195.8  308.6  513.1 
Front Wing 
 
174.5  168.4  109.3  236.0  357.6 
Rear Lamp   144.9  97.1  205.0  108.2  248.4 
Notes: This table shows pre-tax Euro-denominated cross-country mean prices by spare part and for four 









Table 3: Cross-country regression results 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
       Design protection𝑐.𝑡 0.0793*** 0.0656*** 0.0642*** 0.0636*** 0.0635*** 
 
(0.0108) (0.0103) (0.00957) (0.00967) (0.00997) Real GDP per capita PPP, in logs𝑐.𝑡  0.132*** 0.135*** 0.135*** 0.135*** 
  (0.0211) (0.0198) (0.0201) (0.0208) Euro currency𝑐.𝑡  -0.0431*** -0.0400*** -0.0412*** -0.0412*** 
  (0.0118) (0.0108) (0.0110) (0.0113) Domestic brand𝑚,𝑐  -0.117*** -0.144*** -0.143*** -0.144*** 
  (0.0161) (0.0126) (0.0127) (0.0131) 
      
Observations 37,256 37,256 37,256 37,248 37,239 
R-squared 0.711 0.717 0.839 0.926 0.932 
Year FE YES YES YES YES 
 
Model FE   YES   
Spare part FE YES YES YES   
Spare part × model FE 
   
YES 
 
Spare part × model × year FE     YES 
Notes: This table reports cross-country regression estimates based on equations (1) and (2). The sample only consists 
of visible spare parts, that is, the radiator is excluded. The dependent variable is the log pre-tax price of spare part 𝑖 
for car model 𝑚 in country 𝑐 in year 𝑡. 𝐷𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑔𝑛 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑡𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑐.𝑡 is an indicator variable that equals 1 if country 𝑐 
provides design protection for visible spare parts (i.e., does not have a repair clause); otherwise it is 0. Standard 
errors clustered at the country-by-year level are shown in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 




Table 4: Regression estimates by spare part type 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) Design protection𝑐.𝑡     
Bonnet 0.0605*** 0.0596*** 0.0581*** 0.0575*** 
 (0.0119) (0.0112) (0.0102) (0.0104) 
Boot Lid 0.0579*** 0.0564*** 0.0551*** 0.0545*** 
 (0.0121) (0.0115) (0.0113) (0.0114) 
Flasher Lamp 0.132** 0.144** 0.104*** 0.110*** 
 (0.0559) (0.0571) (0.0358) (0.0349) 
Front Bumper 0.0534*** 0.0528*** 0.0565*** 0.0565*** 
 (0.0139) (0.0135) (0.0115) (0.0117) 
Front Door 0.0650*** 0.0627*** 0.0625*** 0.0625*** 
 (0.0115) (0.0108) (0.0107) (0.0109) 
Front Wing 0.0713*** 0.0707*** 0.0659*** 0.0659*** 
 (0.0116) (0.0110) (0.00944) (0.00972) 
Head Lamp 0.0307*** 0.0292*** 0.0310*** 0.0309*** 
 (0.0114) (0.0112) (0.00977) (0.0101) 
Rear Bumper 0.0767*** 0.0757*** 0.0750*** 0.0742*** 
 (0.0143) (0.0138) (0.0128) (0.0131) 
Rear Door 0.0701*** 0.0689*** 0.0669*** 0.0666*** 
 (0.0131) (0.0126) (0.0117) (0.0119) 
Rear Lamp 0.0704*** 0.0689*** 0.0699*** 0.0695*** 
 (0.0141) (0.0136) (0.0119) (0.0121) 
Rear Wing 0.0853*** 0.0833*** 0.0895*** 0.0899*** 
 (0.0184) (0.0179) (0.0131) (0.0130) 
Windscreen 0.0707*** 0.0710*** 0.0694*** 0.0696*** 
 (0.0205) (0.0198) (0.0199) (0.0201) 
Radiator (non-visible) 0.0203 0.0194 0.0155 0.0154 
 (0.0170) (0.0168) (0.0101) (0.0102) Real GDP per capita PPP, in logs𝑐.𝑡 0.130*** 0.133*** 0.132*** 0.133*** 
 (0.0207) (0.0195) (0.0198) (0.0205) Euro currency𝑐.𝑡 -0.0411*** -0.0383*** -0.0394*** -0.0394*** 
 (0.0115) (0.0106) (0.0107) (0.0110) Domestic brand𝑚,𝑐 -0.108*** -0.134*** -0.133*** -0.134*** 
 (0.0144) (0.0125) (0.0126) (0.0130) 
     
Observations 40,944 40,944 40,936 40,927 
R-squared 0.697 0.823 0.920 0.926 
Year FE YES YES YES 
 
Model FE  YES   
Spare part FE YES YES  
 
Spare part × model FE   YES 
 
Spare part × model × year FE 
   
YES 
Notes: This table reports estimates of regression equation (3) that allow estimates to vary by spare part type. The 
dependent variables is the log pre-tax price of spare part 𝑖 for car model m in country 𝑐 in year 𝑡. 𝐷𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑔𝑛 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑡𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑐.𝑡 is an indicator variable that equals 1 if country c offers industrial design protection for 
visible spare parts and 0 otherwise. The radiator is a spare part that is non-visible and therefore not affected by 
the repair clause. Standard errors clustered at the country-by-year level are shown in parentheses. ***, **, and * 





Table 5: Difference-in-differences regression results 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
      Design protection𝑐.𝑡 × visible𝑖   0.0631*** 0.0661*** 0.0473*** 0.0473*** 
 
(0.00362) (0.00849) (0.00779) (0.00813) Real GDP per capita PPP, in logs𝑐.𝑡 0.133*** 0.0653**   
 
(0.00701) (0.0264) 
  Euro currency𝑐.𝑡 -0.0395*** -0.00325   
 
(0.00378) (0.00905) 
  Domestic brand𝑚,𝑐 -0.134*** -0.0425*** -0.0449***  
 (0.00514) (0.00381) (0.00380)  
 
    
Observations 40,927 40,927 40,927 40,927 









Country × model × year FE     YES 
Spare part × model × year FE YES YES YES YES 
Notes: This table reports difference-in-differences regression estimates based on equation (4). The 
dependent variables is the log pre-tax price of spare part 𝑖 for car model 𝑚 in country 𝑐 in year 𝑡. The 
interaction 𝑑𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑔𝑛 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑡𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑐.𝑡 × 𝑣𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑖 equals 1 if country 𝑐 provides design protection for visible 
spare parts (i.e., does not have a repair clause) and spare part 𝑖 is visible; otherwise it is 0. Standard errors 
clustered at the spare-part-by-country-by-year level are shown in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate 







Table 6: Regression estimates by car manufacturer 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) Design protection𝑐.𝑡 × visible𝑖      
Audi 0.0820* 0.0812* 0.0814* 0.0796** 
 
(0.0459) (0.0470) (0.0453) (0.0325) 
BMW 0.00521 0.00459 0.00492 0.00254 
 
(0.0212) (0.0199) (0.0194) (0.0138) 
Citroën 0.0616 0.0599 0.0599 0.0604 
 
(0.0659) (0.0654) (0.0602) (0.0509) 
Fiat 0.00510 0.00394 0.00456 0.00529 
 
(0.0220) (0.0187) (0.0181) (0.0135) 
Ford -0.0209 -0.0215 -0.0207 -0.0202 
 
(0.0211) (0.0207) (0.0191) (0.0154) 
Mercedes 0.0564** 0.0556** 0.0560** 0.0559** 
 
(0.0273) (0.0257) (0.0250) (0.0249) 
Nissan 0.0678 0.0667 0.0667 0.0614* 
 
(0.0457) (0.0416) (0.0406) (0.0358) 
Opel 0.0443** 0.0433** 0.0438** 0.0422*** 
 
(0.0201) (0.0196) (0.0182) (0.0156) 
Peugeot 0.121*** 0.121*** 0.121*** 0.122*** 
 
(0.0247) (0.0245) (0.0245) (0.0242) 
Renault 0.127*** 0.126*** 0.126*** 0.124*** 
 
(0.0317) (0.0322) (0.0327) (0.0331) 
Toyota 0.131*** 0.129*** 0.129*** 0.129*** 
 
(0.0375) (0.0403) (0.0399) (0.0436) 
VW 0.0613** 0.0611** 0.0614** 0.0626*** 
 
(0.0281) (0.0274) (0.0260) (0.0229) Real GDP per capita PPP, in logs𝑐.𝑡 0.132*** 0.133***   
 
(0.00706) (0.0306)   Euro currency𝑐.𝑡 -0.0385*** -0.00388   
 
(0.00381) (0.00900)   Domestic brand𝑚,𝑐 -0.143*** -0.0485*** -0.0515***  
 (0.00512) (0.00404) (0.00404)  
     
Observations 40,927 40,927 40,927 40,927 
R-squared 0.928 0.937 0.941 0.962 
Country FE  YES   
Country × year FE   YES  
Country × model × year FE     YES 
Spare part × model × year FE YES YES YES YES 
Notes: This table reports difference-in-differences regression estimates based on equation (6) that allow effects 
to vary by car manufacturer. The dependent variables is the log pre-tax price of spare part 𝑖 for car model 𝑚 in 
country 𝑐 in year 𝑡. The interaction 𝑑𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑔𝑛 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑡𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑐.𝑡 × 𝑣𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑖 × 𝟙[𝑐𝑎𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑘𝑒𝑟𝑚 = 𝑗] equals 1 if country 𝑐 
provides design protection for visible spare parts (i.e., does not have a repair clause) and spare part i is visible 
and car model 𝑚 is by manufacturer 𝑗; otherwise it is 0. Standard errors clustered at the spare-part-by-country-






Table 7: Case study for Poland, regression results 
  (1)  
(2) (3) 
 Difference-in-differences  Triple differences 
 
    Poland𝑐 0.0524***    
 (0.00918)    Poland𝑐 × postt -0.131***    
 
(0.0119)    Poland𝑐 × visible𝑖   0.0306**  
  (0.0150)  Poland𝑐 × postt × visible𝑖  -0.120*** -0.117*** 
  (0.0307) (0.0291) 
Observations 2,224  2,436 2,436 
R-squared 0.975  0.983 0.984 
Country × spare part FE    YES 
Country × model × year FE    YES YES 
Spare part × model × year FE YES  YES YES 
Notes: This table reports difference-in-differences and tripe differences regression estimates based on 
equations (7) and (8).   The sample is constrained to the Czech Republic (where visible spare parts are design 
protected) and Poland (where a repair clause was introduced in 2007).  The dependent variables is the log pre-
tax price of spare part 𝑖 for car model 𝑚 in country 𝑐 in year 𝑡. The interaction 𝑃𝑜𝑙𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑐 × 𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑡   equals 1 for 
observations in Poland in the year 2007 or after (when the repair clause was introduced). The variable 𝑣𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑖 
is an indicator that is 1 if spare part i is visible. For the difference-in-differences results reported in column (1), 
the sample only consists of visible spare parts. Standard errors clustered at the spare-part-by-country-by-year 









Table 8: Time trends in price dispersion of automotive spare parts, regression estimates 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 
    
Design protection for 
visible spare parts 
     No Yes 
       
Constant 19.28*** 20.52*** 21.11*** 21.76*** 16.18*** 21.31*** 
 (0.501) (0.633) (0.498) (0.691) (0.791) (0.605) Timet (years) -0.300*** -0.683*** -0.341*** -0.564*** -0.860*** -0.773*** 
 (0.0553) (0.132) (0.0628) (0.180) (0.175) (0.134) Timet-squared  0.0214***   0.0401*** 0.0272*** 
  (0.00664)   (0.00911) (0.00751) Euro currency𝑐.2016   -3.692*** -4.481***   
   (0.276) (0.617)   Euro currency𝑐.2016 × time𝑡     0.241   
 
   (0.178)   
Observations 2,901 2,901 3,832 3,832 2,569 2,569 
R-squared 0.587 0.589 0.505 0.506 0.500 0.594 
Spare part × model FE YES YES YES YES YES YES 
 
Notes: This table reports estimates of regression equation (9). The dependent variable is the standard deviation 
of pre-tax Euro-denominated log prices across countries for spare part 𝑖 for car model 𝑚 in year 𝑡. 𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑡 is the 
number of years since 2000. All specifications include a full set of interacted spare part and car model fixed 
effects. Columns (3) and (4), report results from an extended regression equation  Ξ𝑖,𝑚,𝑡𝑒𝑢𝑟𝑜 = 𝛽1𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑡 + 𝛽2𝟙[𝑒𝑢𝑟𝑜 = 1] + 𝛽3𝟙[𝑒𝑢𝑟𝑜 = 1] × 𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑡 + 𝜅𝑖,𝑚 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑚,𝑡, where Ξ𝑖,𝑚,𝑡𝑒𝑢𝑟𝑜=1 and Ξ𝑖,𝑚,𝑡𝑒𝑢𝑟𝑜=0 are 
the standard deviations of spare part prices for the countries in our sample that did and did not adopt the euro by 
2016, the end of our sample period. In this specification, the time trend in price dispersion for non-euro and euro 
countries is given by 𝛽1 and 𝛽1 + 𝛽3. Columns (5) and (6) show results separately for countries without and 
with design protection for visible spare parts. The sample only contains visible spare parts. Robust standard 






Table 9: Price dispersion by carmaker 
  (1) (2) (3) 
 All countries Countries with 
design protection 
Countries without  
design protection 
    
Constant (Mercedes) 16.35*** 17.37*** 11.97*** 
 (0.408) (0.425) (0.735) 
Carmaker    
Audi 1.744** 4.429*** -3.625*** 
 (0.728) (0.819) (0.853) 
BMW -3.362*** -4.716*** 0.682 
 (0.474) (0.498) (0.828) 
Citroën 2.229*** 2.809*** 0.641 
 (0.852) (0.963) (1.307) 
Fiat -0.360 -1.205** 0.874 
 (0.489) (0.550) (0.810) 
Ford -2.003*** -2.934*** 0.471 
 (0.491) (0.522) (0.814) 
Nissan 0.662 -0.278 4.365*** 
 (0.551) (0.625) (1.049) 
Opel -0.300 -2.558*** 1.953** 
 (0.458) (0.475) (0.810) 
Peugeot 4.618*** 5.778*** -1.301 
 (0.593) (0.640) (0.893) 
Renault 2.664*** 2.407*** 0.760 
 (0.562) (0.633) (0.846) 
Toyota 1.879*** 0.535 3.205*** 
 (0.553) (0.668) (0.941) 
VW 2.014*** 3.199*** -0.208 
 (0.561) (0.575) (0.961) 
    
Observations 2,963 2,963 2,962 
R-squared 0.274 0.327 0.168 
Spare part  ×  year FE yes yes yes 
 
 
Notes: This table shows estimates of carmaker-specific price dispersion based on estimating equation (10). 
Estimates have to be interpreted relative to the reference category (Mercedes). In column (2) and (3), price 
dispersion is calculated only for countries with and without design protection for visible spare parts (i.e., 
countries without and with a repair clause). The sample only contains visible spare parts. Robust standard 
















Table 10: Price dispersion, difference-in-differences regression results 
  (1) (2) (3) 
    Design protection𝑐.𝑡 × visible𝑖  0.712** 0.744** 0.758* 




Observations 5,836 5,836 5,836 
R-squared 0.204 0.257 0.753 
Year FE YES   
Model FE YES YES  
Spare Part FE YES   
Design protection FE YES   
Spare Part X year FE  YES  
Design protection X year FE  YES  
Spare Part X model X year FE   YES 
Design Protection X model X year FE   YES 
 
 
Notes: This table reports difference-in-differences regression estimates based on equation (11). The dependent 
variable is the standard deviation of pre-tax Euro-denominated log prices across countries for spare part 𝑖 for 
car model 𝑚 in year 𝑡 across countries with and without design protection for visible spare parts. The 
interaction 𝑑𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑔𝑛 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑡𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑐.𝑡 × 𝑣𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑖 equals 1 if country 𝑐 provides design protection for visible spare 
parts (i.e., does not have a repair clause) and spare part i is visible; otherwise it is 0. Standard errors clustered at 
the spare-part-by-design-protection level are shown in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 









Figure 2: Aggregate country price indices for selected countries, 2001-2016 
 
Notes: This shows aggregate price indices for spare parts for selected countries from 2001 to 2016. Indices 
represent estimated country-by-year effects based the hedonic price regression log 𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑖,𝑚,𝑐,𝑡 = 𝜇𝑐,𝑡 + 𝜑𝑖,𝑚,𝑡 +𝜀𝑖,𝑚,𝑐,𝑡. The spare-part-by-model-by-year fixed effects 𝜑𝑖,𝑚,𝑡 account for variation in spare part prices that is 
uniform across countries. The residual country-by-time price differences are captured by the estimated price 
indices 𝜇𝑐,𝑡. The y-axis shows the percentage price-difference relative to Belgium. 
 
Figure 1: Spare part prices in countries with and without repair clause 
  
Notes: This shows a comparison of good-specific price deviations from the European mean in countries with 







Figure 3: The relation between price dispersion and estimated price effect 
Notes: This plots the manufacturer-specific price dispersion on the y-axis against the estimated price effect on 
the x-axis. In the left panel, price dispersion is calculated for all countries in our sample. In the right panel, price 
dispersion is calculated separately for countries with and without design protection for visible spare parts (i.e., 
countries without and with a repair clause). The estimated price effects are reported in column (4) of Table 6; 
















Countries in our sample   
Austria (AT) no 2001-2008,2010-2016 15 1995 1999 
Belgium (BE)  yes 2001-2008,2010-2016 15 1957 1999 
Cyprus (CY) no 2001-2008,2010-2016 15 2004 2008 
Czech Republic (CZ) no 2001-2008,2010-2013 12 2004 - 
Denmark (DK) no 2001-2008,2011-2012,2016 11 1973 - 
Finland (FI) no 2001-2007,2010-2016 14 1995 1999 
France (FR) no 2001-2008,2010-2013 15 1957 1999 
Germany (DE) no*  2001-2006,2010-2016 13 1957 1999 
Greece (GR) no 2001-2005,2007-2008 8 1981 2002 
Hungary (HU) yes 2001-2005,2007-2010 8 2004 - 
Italy (IT) yes (2001) 2001-2008,2010-2011 10 1957 1999 
Netherlands (NL) yes 2001-2008,2010-2011 4 1957 1999 
Norway (NO) no 2001-2005,2007-2008, 
2010,2013,2015-2016 
11 - - 
Poland (PL) yes (2007) 2001-2003,2011-2016 9 2004 - 
Spain (ES) yes 2001-2008,2010-2016 15 1986 1999 
Sweden (SE) no 2001-2004,2007-2008 6 1995 - 
Switzerland (CH) no 2001-2005 5 - - 
United Kingdom (UK) yes 2001-2006,2012-2016 11 1973 - 
EU member countries not in our sample   
Bulgaria no - - 2007 - 
Croatia no - - 2013 - 
Estonia no - - 2004 2011 
Ireland yes - - 1973 1999 
Latvia yes - - 2004 2014 
Lithuania yes - - 2004 2015 
Luxembourg yes - - 1957 1999 
Malta no - - 2004 2008 
Portugal no - - 1986 2008 
Romania no - - 2007 - 
Slovakia no - - 2004 2009 
Slovenia no - - 2004 2007 
Notes: This shows the county coverage of our sample. Information on the repair clause is from Europe 
Economics (2015) and Beldiman and Blanke-Roeser (2017). *The German government decided to introduce 
a repair clause in German design law on 10 September 2020. The repair clause applies to all designs 






Table A.2: Revenues of the top 50 suppliers in Europe in 2018 (in million US Dollars) 
 







Table A.3: Balance tests 
 (1)          (2)     (3)        (4)  (5) (6) 
  Design protection for visible spare parts  
  
 
No  Yes  
T-test 
(equality of means) 
 Obs. Mean (SE)  Obs. Mean (SE)  Diff-in-mean P-value Real GDP PPP 6 977623.62  12 597055.83  380567.79 0.37 
  (310500.57)   (244826.01)    Population 6 32.43  12 20.27  12.15 0.35 
  (9.44)   (7.55)    Real GDP per capita PPP 6 28608.031  12 30912.824  -2304.79 0.61 
  (3121.66)   (2712.50)    Euro currency2002 6 0.67  12 0.412  0.25 0.35 
 
 (0.21)   (0.15)    
Notes: This table reports difference-in-means for various covariates at the beginning of the sample period (2001) 
between countries with and without design protection for visible spare parts. The p-value refers to a t-test on the 








Table A.4: Regression estimates, cheap spare parts 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
      Design protection𝑐.𝑡 × visible𝑖   0.0515*** 0.0487*** 0.0401*** 0.0392*** 
 
(0.00622) (0.00908) (0.00682) (0.00783) Real GDP per capita PPP, in logs𝑐.𝑡 0.143*** 0.0773*   
 
(0.00971) (0.0410) 
  Euro currency𝑐.𝑡 -0.0276*** -0.0196   
 
(0.00576) (0.0165) 
  Domestic brand𝑐.𝑡 -0.0881*** -0.0150** -0.0171***  
 (0.00813) (0.00621) (0.00625)  
 
    
Observations 14,792 14,792 14,792 14,791 









Country × model × year FE     YES 
Spare part × model × year FE YES YES YES YES 
Notes: This table reports difference-in-differences regression estimates based on equation (4) when the 
sample is limited to relatively cheap spare parts (head lamp, front wing, rear lamp, radiator, see Table 2). 
The dependent variables is the log pre-tax price of spare part 𝑖 for car model 𝑚 in country 𝑐 in year 𝑡. The 
interaction 𝑑𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑔𝑛 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑡𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑐.𝑡 × 𝑣𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑖 equals 1 if country 𝑐 provides design protection for visible 
spare parts (i.e., does not have a repair clause) and spare part 𝑖 is visible; otherwise it is 0. Standard errors 
clustered at the spare-part-by-country-by-year level are shown in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate 






Table A.5: Regression estimates, one country left out at a time 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
     
     Design protection𝑐.𝑡 × visible𝑖  0.0481*** 0.0457*** 0.0427*** 0.0501*** 0.0380*** 0.0380*** 0.0644*** 0.0560*** 0.0473*** 
 
(0.00901) (0.00855) (0.00846) (0.00870) (0.00790) (0.00846) (0.00761) (0.00856) (0.00835) 
          
Observations 37,682 37,761 38,279 38,394 38,615 37,931 37,701 38,088 39,461 
R-squared 0.963 0.962 0.964 0.961 0.963 0.963 0.962 0.962 0.963 
Country × model × year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Spare part × model × year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Country dropped Austria Belgium Cyprus Czech Republic Denmark Finland France Germany Greece 
Table A.5 : (continued) 
 
(10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) 
     
     Design protection𝑐.𝑡 × visible𝑖  0.0466*** 0.0475*** 0.0429*** 0.0436*** 0.0489*** 0.0535*** 0.0446*** 0.0474*** 0.0466*** 
 
(0.00824) (0.00843) (0.00826) (0.00853) (0.00816) (0.00845) (0.00827) (0.00835) (0.00840) 
          
Observations 40,180 39,334 38,867 38,627 38,994 37,670 39,720 39,905 38,542 
R-squared 0.962 0.963 0.962 0.963 0.962 0.961 0.963 0.962 0.964 
Country × model × year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Spare part × model × year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Country dropped Netherlands Hungary Italy Norway Poland Spain Sweden Switzerland 
United 
Kingdom 
Notes:  This table reports difference-in-differences regression estimates based on equations (4) when one country is left out of the sample at a time. The dependent variable is the log pre-
tax price of spare part 𝑖 for car model 𝑚 in country 𝑐 in year 𝑡. The interaction 𝑑𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑔𝑛 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑡𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑐.𝑡 × 𝑣𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑖  equals 1 if country 𝑐 provides design protection for visible spare parts (i.e., 
does not have a repair clause) and spare part 𝑖 is visible; otherwise it is 0. Standard errors clustered at the spare-part-by-country-by-year level are shown in parentheses. ***, **, and * 





Table A.6: Difference-in-differences regression results by vehicle size 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 
    Design protection𝑐.𝑡 × visible𝑖  
     
Minicompact 0.0482*** 0.0473*** 0.0477*** 0.0467*** 
 
(0.0163) (0.0155) (0.0141) (0.0130) 
Subcompact 0.0624*** 0.0614*** 0.0618*** 0.0620*** 
 
(0.0128) (0.0119) (0.0107) (0.0112) 
Small family 0.0368*** 0.0359*** 0.0366*** 0.0363*** 
 
(0.0117) (0.0115) (0.00982) (0.00972) 
Mid-size 0.0276 0.0269 0.0274 0.0252* 
 
(0.0193) (0.0177) (0.0170) (0.0140) Real GDP per capita PPP, in logs𝑐.𝑡 0.132*** 0.132***   
 
(0.00704) (0.0306) 
  Euro currency𝑐.𝑡 -0.0398*** -0.00454   
 
(0.00379) (0.00900) 
  Domestic brand𝑚,𝑐 -0.132*** -0.0394*** -0.0415***  
 (0.00505) (0.00382) (0.00382)  
     
Observations 40,927 40,927 40,927 40,927 





Country × year FE   YES  
Country × model × year FE     YES 
Spare part × model × year FE YES YES YES YES 
Notes: This table reports difference-in-differences regression estimates based on equation (5) that allow effects 
to vary by four car categories. The dependent variables is the log pre-tax price of spare part 𝑖 for car model 𝑚 
in country 𝑐 in year 𝑡. The interaction 𝑑𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑔𝑛 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑡𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑐.𝑡 × 𝑣𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑖 × 𝟙[𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑚 = 𝑗] equals 1 if country 𝑐 
provides design protection for visible spare parts (i.e., does not have a repair clause) and spare part i is visible 
and car model 𝑚 is of size category 𝑗; otherwise it is 0. Standard errors clustered at the spare-part-by-country-






Table A.7: Regression estimates by car manufacturer and vehicle size 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Design protection𝑐.𝑡 × visible𝑖      
     Minicompact 
    
Fiat -0.00411 -0.00476 -0.00368 -0.00347 
 
(0.0269) (0.0232) (0.0229) (0.0176) 
Ford -0.0232 -0.0237 -0.0236 -0.0234 
 
(0.0276) (0.0280) (0.0268) (0.0234) 
Nissan 0.0964* 0.0962** 0.0954** 0.0913** 
 
(0.0536) (0.0480) (0.0473) (0.0409) 
Opel 0.0727** 0.0715** 0.0714** 0.0692*** 
 
(0.0309) (0.0309) (0.0284) (0.0251) 
Peugeot 0.117*** 0.116*** 0.116*** 0.115*** 
 
(0.0401) (0.0399) (0.0400) (0.0393) 
Renault 0.0908** 0.0892** 0.0895** 0.0883** 
 
(0.0357) (0.0355) (0.0359) (0.0360) 
VW 0.0381 0.0381 0.0381 0.0381 
 
(0.0775) (0.0790) (0.0767) (0.0656) 
Subcompact     
Citroen 0.0616 0.0599 0.0599 0.0604 
 
(0.0660) (0.0654) (0.0602) (0.0509) 
Fiat 0.0145 0.0131 0.0132 0.0139 
 
(0.0218) (0.0193) (0.0187) (0.0161) 
Ford -0.0269 -0.0274 -0.0275 -0.0274 
 
(0.0233) (0.0225) (0.0210) (0.0169) 
Opel 0.0303 0.0287 0.0303 0.0291 
 
(0.0262) (0.0257) (0.0248) (0.0213) 
Peugeot 0.126*** 0.125*** 0.125*** 0.126*** 
 
(0.0244) (0.0233) (0.0233) (0.0234) 
Renault 0.160*** 0.159*** 0.159*** 0.157*** 
 
(0.0358) (0.0369) (0.0373) (0.0374) 
VW 0.0669*** 0.0664*** 0.0669*** 0.0687*** 
 
(0.0239) (0.0220) (0.0209) (0.0197) 
Compact     
Audi 0.0820* 0.0812* 0.0814* 0.0796** 
 
(0.0459) (0.0470) (0.0453) (0.0325) 
BMW 0.0146 0.0140 0.0144 0.0145 
 
(0.0284) (0.0270) (0.0268) (0.0226) 
Ford -0.0124 -0.0129 -0.0109 -0.0103 
 
(0.0244) (0.0235) (0.0220) (0.0196) 
Nissan 0.0375 0.0353 0.0362 0.0314 
 
(0.0439) (0.0411) (0.0399) (0.0402) 
Opel 0.0294 0.0289 0.0288 0.0281 
 
(0.0235) (0.0227) (0.0225) (0.0190) 
Toyota 0.131*** 0.129*** 0.129*** 0.129*** 
 
(0.0375) (0.0403) (0.0400) (0.0436) 




Mid-Size     
BMW -0.00110 -0.00172 -0.00157 -0.00547 
 
(0.0217) (0.0209) (0.0204) (0.0145) 
Mercedes 0.0564** 0.0555** 0.0560** 0.0559** 
 
(0.0273) (0.0257) (0.0250) (0.0249) 
 
    Real GDP per capita PPP, in logs𝑐.𝑡 0.132*** 0.133***   
 
(0.00708) (0.0306) 
  Euro currency𝑐.𝑡 -0.0383*** -0.00356   
 
(0.00381) (0.00899) 
  Domestic brand𝑚,𝑐 -0.143*** -0.0485*** -0.0515***  
 (0.00511) (0.00403) (0.00403)  
     
Observations 40,927 40,927 40,927 40,927 
R-squared 0.926 0.937 0.941 0.962 
Country FE  YES   
Country × year FE   YES  
Country × model × year FE     YES 
Spare part × model × year FE YES YES YES YES 
 
Notes: This table reports difference-in-differences regression estimates based on an extended version of equation 
(5) that allows effects to vary by car manufacturer and vehicle size. The dependent variables is the log pre-tax 
price of spare part 𝑖 for car model 𝑚 in country 𝑐 in year 𝑡. The interaction 𝑑𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑔𝑛 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑡𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑐.𝑡 × 𝑣𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑖 ×𝟙[𝑐𝑎𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑘𝑒𝑟𝑚 = 𝑗] × 𝟙[𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑚 = 𝑘] equals 1 if country 𝑐 provides design protection for visible spare parts (i.e., 
does not have a repair clause) and spare part i is visible and car model 𝑚 is by manufacturer 𝑗 and of vehicle size 𝑘; otherwise it is 0. Standard errors clustered at the spare-part-by-country-by-year level are shown in parentheses. 






Figure A.1: Cross-country price differences 
 
Notes: This shows the good-by-good price dispersion of twelve types of visible spare parts for 60 different car 
models sold in 18 European countries between 2001 and 2016. Price dispersion is measured as log deviations from 
the geometric-average European price for spare part 𝑖 for car model 𝑚 in year 𝑡, 𝑞𝑖,𝑚,𝑐,𝑡 = log 𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑖,𝑚,𝑐,𝑡 −1𝑁 ∑ log 𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑖,𝑚,𝑗,𝑡𝑁𝑗=1 , where 𝑁 is the number of countries. We exclude the small number of observations where |𝑞𝑖,𝑚,𝑐,𝑡| > 0.75. 
 
Figure A.2: Price dispersion over time in the EU 
 
Notes: This shows the distribution of the standard deviation of pre-tax Euro-denominated log prices for visible 
spare part 𝑖 for a car model 𝑚 in year 𝑡 across countries 𝑐, 𝛯𝑖,𝑚,𝑡 = 100 × 𝑆𝑡𝑑(log 𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑖,𝑚,𝑐,𝑡| 𝑖, 𝑚, 𝑡). Boxes 
represent the 25th–75th percentile range, with the horizontal line denoting the median. The lower whisker ends 
at the largest observed value below the 25th percentile minus 1.5 interquartile ranges threshold, and the upper 
whisker ends at the smallest observed value above the 75th percentile plus 1.5 interquartile ranges threshold. 






Figure A.3: LOOP deviations for countries without and with repair clause 
 
Notes: This shows histograms of 𝑞𝑖,𝑚,𝑐,𝑡𝑑=1  and 𝑞𝑖,𝑚,𝑐,𝑡𝑑=0  for visible spare parts, the good-specific price deviations 
from the mean for the sample of countries with design protection for visible spare parts (no repair clause, gray) 
and without (repair clause, red). Price dispersion for the latter group is substantially smaller: the ratio of the 
standard deviations is about 75%.  
